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THE IMPACT OF ACCESS TO
CREDIT ON HOUSEHOLD
WELFARE IN RURAL VIETNAM
M. H. Quach and A. W. Mullineux
ABSTRACT
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of household borrowing
from the formal financial sector, the determinants of credit rationing by
the formal sector and the impact of credit on household welfare in rural
Vietnam. We find that education, savings, the area devoted to farming
and the availability of formal credit are important determinants of both
household borrowing and credit rationing by the formal sector. We also
find that credit has a positive (albeit small) effect on household welfare in
rural Vietnam. Our findings have policy implications for land and banking
sector reform.
1. INTRODUCTION
A considerable amount of research has been devoted to understanding the
functioning of credit markets, credit market imperfections and credit ra-
tioning (Amano, 1999; Bester, 1985, 1987; de Meza & Webb, 1987; Hell-
mann & Stiglitz, 2000; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981; Swank, 1996). Credit
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rationing is broadly regarded as an excess demand for bank loans caused by
the asymmetry of information on investment projects between banks and
borrowers. Credit rationing occurs if some borrowers have limited access to
credit. It thus affects the number of borrowers who receive credit. The other
form of rationing occurs when some borrowers are rationed by the amount
of credit, i.e., receive less than the amount of credit they demanded.
There has also been a focus on the analysis of rural credit markets (Meyer
& Nagarajan, 1992, 2000), which are widely believed to be characterised by
high lending transaction costs and lack of collateral when farmers do not
own their own land, resulting in high interest rates being charged to bor-
rowers. A combination of the above raises a very interesting research ques-
tion: How do lenders in rural credit markets select borrowers and how much
do they lend?
A number of recent papers have analysed such questions (Kochar, 1997;
Pham & Izumita, 2002, Ranjula, 2002; Zeller, 1994). Their approaches and
ﬁndings vary and differ, largely due to inadequate data. Zeller (1994) sees
credit rationing as a function of access to the market conditional on the
demand function of borrowers and ﬁnds that both formal and informal
lenders1 ration loan supply. They look at total household wealth and the
leverage ratio of households. Pham and Izumita (2002) assume an excess
demand for credit in the rural markets and thus see credit rationing as a
function of access to the market or external credit rationing. They ﬁnd that
reputation, the dependence ratio and the amount of credit demanded are
determinants of credit rationing. Their results imply that poorer households
are more likely to be rationed.
Another question that one may also pose is, What determines the amount
of credit that a household receives? Theoretically, the demand and supply of
credit determine the amount of credit, and thus the demand and supply
functions need to be separately identiﬁed (Pitt & Khandker, 1996; Yadav,
Otsuka, & David, 1992). The problem of simultaneous functions leaves the
construction of variables a critical issue for the consistent estimate of the
household credit functions. Various approaches have been proposed to re-
solve this issue. For example, based on household and province attributes,
Pham and Izumita (2002) construct variables that proxy for both demand
and supply. They ﬁnd that farming area and the total value of livestock are
decisive determinants of household borrowing from the formal sector. Oth-
ers, such as Pitt and Khandker (1996), Khandker (2003) and Khandker and
Faruqee (2003), consider household characteristics (such as age and edu-
cation), village ﬁxed effects (such as prices of selected products) and the
competition characteristics (such as characteristics of competitor villages) as
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the factors of household borrowing and ﬁnd education and land owned are
the core factors.
Another voluminous strand of literature on the rural credit market at-
tempts to measure the impact of credit on household welfare.2 Most of this
research supports the idea that credit contributes positively to household
welfare through improving household production or smoothing consump-
tion over time. The literature also shows that most credit programs do not
serve the poorest households, but when the poorest households are served
they can deﬁnitely beneﬁt through increased income and reduced vulner-
ability to ‘‘shocks’’ (Morduch & Haley, 2002).
In the context of rural Vietnam, there has been relatively little work
(Pham & Izumita, 2002) on the three issues above: determinants of house-
hold credit access; determinants of household borrowing; and the impact of
credit on household welfare.
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an empirical analysis
of the rural credit market in Vietnam. The paper concentrates on formal
credit,3 as this plays a dominant role in Vietnam (Dao, 2002). The purpose
of this paper is to analyse (i) the determinants of formal credit access in rural
Vietnam; (ii) why and how formal lenders ration credit; and (iii) how access
to credit contributes to household welfare. The rest of this paper is organ-
ised as follows. In the next section, we brieﬂy describe the credit market in
rural Vietnam. Next, we present the econometric model and the hypotheses.
Section 4 discusses the characteristics of the household survey data that has
been used in this paper. The results of the estimation and testing are pre-
sented in Section 5, along with an analysis of the results. The ﬁnal section
concludes with a summary of the ﬁndings and draws a policy conclusion.
2. THE RURAL CREDIT MARKET
The rural credit market in Vietnam has been well described in recent pa-
pers.4 Brieﬂy, the rural credit market in Vietnam is categorised into three
core sectors: formal, semi-formal and informal. In the formal sector, key
providers of microﬁnance services are the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and
Rural development (VBARD), the Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP – now
known as Social Policy Bank), the People Credit Funds (PCFs) and the
Rural Shareholding Banks (RSHBs). The semi-formal sector is dominated
by National Programs, Microﬁnance Programs of Mass Organisations (such
as the Women’s Union or Farmer’s Union), and Savings & Credit Schemes
supported by NGOs and donors. These formal and semi-formal schemes
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however, were either unable to meet the huge demand for ﬁnancial services
or they could not reach the poor. In such cases, the poor have to rely on the
informal credit schemes, which consist mainly of credit extended by families,
friends, traders, ROSCAs and private moneylenders.
Typically, formal and semi-formal ﬁnancial sectors in Vietnam provide
credit to rural households for the speciﬁc purposes of rural development
and/or poverty reduction at cheaper interest rates. Thus, these sectors ba-
sically employ their own criteria in selecting and screening borrowers who
are eligible to receive loans from them. For this reason, we include the semi-
formal sector in the formal sector in our study of credit exclusion.
There has been an increasing role of formal credit in the rural credit
market. At the end of 1998, formal credit accounted for only 49%, but by
the end of 2001, this ﬁgure was 70.2% of borrowing households in rural
areas (Dao, 2002). In the formal sector, VBARD plays an important role. In
1998, it accounted for 68% of borrowing households and 75% of the out-
standing loans in the formal sector (Dao, 2002). The network of VBARD
branches reaches to village level using the model of village banking and/or
mobile banking. The monthly interest rate charged in the formal sector is,
on average, relatively low, at 1.26%, compared with the 3.95% charged in
the informal sector (McCarty, 2001). The average loan size from the formal
sector is higher at VND 3.2 million, compared with VND 1.7 million in the
formal sector (Dao, 2002; McCarty, 2001). However, VBARD usually
grants approximately 50% of the actual loan amount requested by a low-
income household, and the most decisive criterion for lending is the list of
assets of the potential borrower. The most commonly accepted form of
asset/collateral is the Land Use Certiﬁcate (LUC).5 If a household has not
been provided with the LUC, certiﬁcation by local authorities that the land
is free from disputes can be used as a loan guarantee (Dao, 2002).
The rural credit market is segmented. Following government policy, for-
mal ﬁnancial institutions offer loans only for the purpose of production
(Dao, 2002). In 1998, loans for production capital accounted for about
63.7% of all the loans taken from all sources (McCarty, 2001). Borrowers
must present a business proposal when applying for a loan. Furthermore,
although the government requires no collateral for loans of up to VND 10
million (equivalent to USD 600), households in general are required to
provide their LUCs as collateral in order to a secure a loan (Dao, 2002).
Business plans and LUCs are therefore important criteria for the screening
of applicants (Mishkin, 2001, chap. 8, pp. 187–198) by formal lenders. The
reasons for borrowing from the informal sector are various, of which
smoothing consumption (Morduch & Haley, 2002; Rutherford, 1998) is
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important. A survey in 2001 conducted by the Microﬁnance Resource Cen-
ter at the National Economics University revealed that almost 99% of in-
terviewed households took loans from the informal sector at higher interest
rates as a result of restricted access to the formal sector (Dao, 2001).6 Be-
cause rural households in Vietnam traditionally dislike being indebted to
individuals, informal borrowing can be viewed either as distress borrowing
or the second choice. Households may however borrow from relatives or
friends at very low interest rates, but they are not normally in the form of
contracts and are therefore temporary.
The government policy framework regarding the rural credit market is
also a big concern (Dao, 2002). First, although the interest rate has been
liberalised gradually, the low basic interest rates have discouraged formal
institutions from extending to more rural households due to high transac-
tion costs that create ﬁnancial repression (McKinnon, 1973; Shaw, 1973).
Second, the issuance of LUCs has been slow and has not yet been completed
in many provinces. This reduces the probability of access of rural house-
holds to formal credit. Furthermore, an effective use of LUCs as collateral
requires a market for transferring LUCs, which does not exist. Third, the
policy of expanding lending to rural households and the use of the group
lending method7 with support from social organizations (such as the
Farmer’s Union or the Women’s Union) has been causing a danger of
delinquency. Households are formed and certiﬁed by social organisations in
order to get loans, and they may get higher loans in the next cycle if they do
not default, i.e., a rotational system of lending. As a result, many house-
holds borrow from the informal sector (short-term loans from money lend-
ers, friends and relatives), repay the formal loans and then get higher formal
loans to pay back their informal lenders. Thus, a feature of the rural credit
market in Vietnam is the dominance of formal credit. This is different from
many other developing countries mainly because of the widespread network
of VBARD branches and the supporting policy of the government to extend
credit to rural households. This, together with low interest rates, explains
why formal credit is preferred by rural households in Vietnam and the fact
that households borrow from the informal sector simply because they lack
access to the formal sector.
3. THE MODEL
Consider three sets of agents in the rural credit market: households (po-
tential borrowers), formal lenders (such as VBARD) and informal lenders
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(such as money lenders, relatives, friends and ROSCAs). Of the households,
there are borrowing and non-borrowing households. Households may bor-
row from formal lenders, informal lenders or both in order to ﬁnance their
economic activities.8 Households have a demand for credit and apply for
loans. The demand for credit depends on household attributes and the vil-
lage characteristics in which homeowners are living. Lenders then screen the
applications and decide to whom they will offer loans and how much to
offer (as the interest rate is ﬁxed). As credit rationing is typical in credit
markets (Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981), especially under ﬁnancial repression, some
applicants receive loans, others are rejected and yet others receive smaller
loans than they desire. There are thus three major questions that need to be
answered: (i) What are the determinants of the credit supply to households?
(ii) What are the determinants of credit rationing in the rural credit market?
(iii) How much does credit contribute to household welfare?
3.1. The Determinants of Credit
If we consider only households with loans as those that have a demand for
credit, it may lead to a sample selection bias because it is possible that
households without loans may have a demand for credit but be excluded.
However, we ignore the problem that some households receive less credit
than they demanded at the pre-set interest rate, i.e., they were also rationed
but not in the form of exclusion. In other words, to control for sample
selection bias, we adopt the ﬁnancial exclusion form of credit rationing.
Furthermore, the amount of credit supplied to a household that a researcher
can observe is the result of the interaction between demand and supply. The
difﬁculty is that the factors that are likely to affect household demand for
credit are also likely to affect the supply of credit. For example, ownership
of farming land may positively affect household demand for credit, while it
may also positively affect the supply of credit if the lenders regard it to be
collateral in rural market (e.g., in the case of VBARD). This implies that
credit supply and demand curves cannot be easily identiﬁed. Thus, the de-
terminants of a credit model, rather than demand and supply separately, are
estimated as follows using Tobit regression:
y ¼ yi ¼
f ðxi; ziÞ if yi 40
0 if yi  0
(
(1)
where yi represents the amount of credit that one household receives from
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source i, which equals f(xi) if a household has loans and 0 otherwise
(i ¼ source of credit such as formal, informal or total credit); xi is a vector of
explanatory variables that reﬂect household and local market characteris-
tics; and zi is a vector of additional explanatory variables proxied for the
supply side of credit. Household characteristics include natural attributes
(e.g., gender and age) and capital assets (e.g., length of education, land
ownership and savings). Location characteristics represent distance-com-
parative-effects and consist of socio-economic factors such as prices of se-
lected common goods and services (e.g., rice, pork and sewing), the mean QA :1of
local household characteristics (e.g., average of education years in com-
mune).
The supply of credit depends on the terms of loan contracts, the avail-
ability of credit and the competition for loans among borrowers. Given an
excess demand for formal credit, as a result of ﬁnancial repression, and the
lack of liquid collateral, we propose that what could actually determine the
supply of credit is the availability of credit. We consider the availability of
credit at three levels: province, commune and village. Availability of credit
from source i is proxied by the total credit from source i. How lenders
allocate credit depends on the competition between households at the com-
mune and village levels (Khandker & Faruqee, 2003). Competition is de-
pendent on household and local characteristics, which are included in xi and
the number of potential borrowers (proxied by the number of households in
the commune). Moreover, as various sources of credit are substitutes and
demand for one source of credit (such as informal credit) may depend on the
supply of another source (such as formal credit), we also include the variable
proxy for the supply of credit from a substitute source in zi. Thus, zi includes
variables that proxy for the availability of credit, the number of competitors
and the supply of credit from a substitute source.
3.2. Determinants of Credit Rationing
Eq. (1) is used to explain factors that affect the amount of credit supplied to
a household. It does not specify why some households receive loans while
the others are excluded or receive less than the amount demanded. In other
words, we may see credit rationing in the rural market, but how do lenders
ration credit? Clearly, borrowing is a function of demand for credit and
thereby access to the market. What a researcher can observe as the outcome
of this process is the amount of credit supplied and the outcome of appli-
cations. As the decision to offer loans is conditional on the decision to apply
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for loans, it is necessary to separate these two stages: ﬁrst households decide
whether to apply for loans and then lenders decide whether to offer or reject
the applications. We employ the Heckman approach ( QA :2see Heckman,
1974,1976, 1979, 1980), in which the probability of a household receiving a
loan depends ﬁrst on it has a demand for credit and then on whether its
application is accepted by the lender (see similar framework, for example,
Zeller, 1994). The ﬁrst-stage model takes the form below:
PðyiÞ ¼ f ðxiÞ (2)
where yi equals 1 if a household has demand for credit from source i, and 0
otherwise; xi is a vector of explanatory variables that are similar to xi in Eq.
(1), and then
PðyiÞ ¼ f ðxi; zi; niÞ (3)
where yi equals 1 if a household receives loans from source i; xi and zi are
vectors of explanatory variables. ni is the Mill’s ratio (see Greene, 2003;
Wooldridge, 2003 for details) computed from Eq. (2), which controls the
sample selection bias. Vector xi in Eq. (3) represents the household and local
characteristics that the lender may use to screen applicants such as age,
education, savings and land use. Vector zi again represents the supply side of
credit, which includes proxy variables for the availability of credit and
competition between communes (e.g., poverty incidence in the commune
and province and average education standards in the commune).
3.3. The Impact of Credit on Household Welfare
The purpose of this subsection is to estimate the effect of household credit
(borrowings) on household welfare. Since household welfare (e.g., expend-
iture) is positively affected by factors that also affect household credit, a
simple regression of a welfare equation conditional on household credit may
generate biased results. Pitt and Khandker (1996) outline three possible
sources of endogeneity of household credit. First, it is possible that credit is
not randomly allocated. Lenders (especially formal lenders) may allocate
credit based on local socio-economic conditions (e.g., poverty incidence).
Second, even if the allocation of credit is random, it is possible that un-
observable local attributes may well affect both household demand for
credit and household welfare. Third, unmeasured household attributes may
affect both household demand for credit and household welfare. For ex-
ample, households with more effort and dedication may demand more
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credit and thus create higher quality welfare. Recent studies have proposed
different techniques but the same approach to this problem (e.g., Khandker
& Faruqee, 2003; Pham & Izumita, 2002; Pitt & Khandker, 1996). The
prevalent approach uses instrumental variables to control the endogeneity
of credit in the ﬁrst stage and then corrects it for the household welfare
equation in the second stage. We adopt the econometric framework pro-
posed in Pitt and Khandker (1996) and Khandker and Faruqee (2003).
Consider the reduced form of the household welfare equation, as follows:
yi ¼ f ðC i; xi; uYi Þ (4)
where the subscript indicates household i; yi indicates the outcome of in-
terest (e.g., per capita expenditure); C is the amount of credit borrowed; xi is
a vector of observable factors affecting household welfare; and uY is a vector
of unobservable factors of welfare. Vector xi includes household and loca-
tion characteristics (e.g., age, gender, savings and prices of selected goods
and services). As uY is unobservable, it is possible that household credit may
serve as an indicator of these unobservable variables, and thus it causes
biased results in the estimation of Eq. (4).
To offer a solution for endogenous credit, we ﬁrst estimate the determi-
nants of household credit, which include instrumental variables that will not
be included in Eq. (4) but can be used to predict the amount of household
credit that does not depend on household characteristics. Appropriate in-
strumental variables should not be correlated with household welfare but
must be closely correlated with the amount of credit borrowed. In Eq. (1),
there are two sets of variables, of which we can see the availability of credit
may well serve as instruments. It is safe to assume that the availability of
credit at the commune and village levels does affect the total household
borrowing but it does not affect the welfare at the household level. Thus the
ﬁrst stage equation is similar to Eq. (1). However, we use the total house-
hold borrowings as a dependent variable, rather than borrowing from one
speciﬁc source. The reason for using the total credit is that if we use one
source of credit, it is possible that another source of credit, rather than the
controlled source, affects the household welfare. The predicted values are
then used instead of actual values in the second stage (i.e., Eq. (4)) to correct
for selection bias. The alternative option is to insert both the actual values
and the predicted residuals computed from ﬁrst stage into the second stage
equation. The coefﬁcient of the predicted residual in the second stage equa-
tion then indicates whether or not the endogeneity of credit is signiﬁcant.
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4. DATA AND MEASUREMENT
The data are drawn from the Vietnam Living Standards Survey – VLSS
1997/1998. The survey was conducted in 1997/1998 by the General Statis-
tical Ofﬁce. The survey was funded by the UNDP and the Swedish Inter-
national Development Authority (SIDA). The survey is a part of the Living
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys conducted in a
number of developing countries with technical assistance from the World
Bank. The survey covers a sample of 5,999 households, 194 communes and
388 villages. The proportion of rural households is 71.2% (4,269 house-
holds), and there are 38.9% of rural households borrowing from all sources.
However, after adjusting for data omission, we have selected a sample of
4,101 rural households, of which there are 2,108 borrowing households. Of
the borrowing households, 1,246 households borrow from formal sources;
1,213 households borrow from informal sources, resulting in a number of
351 households having loans from both sources. The informal sources of
credit include money lenders, relatives and friends, ROSCAs and other in-
dividuals. If we exclude all households with zero-interest rate loans from
informal sources (most of them have loans from friends and relatives), the
sample of borrowing households reduces to 1,645 households. Table 1 gives
a brief description of the sample, and Table 2 provides a statistical descrip-
tion of the key variables. Further analysis of variables is undertaken in the
following sections.
5. THE RESULTS
5.1. Determinants of Formal Credit
We conducted two separate tests to estimate the determinants of household
formal credit allocation. The ﬁrst test (Test 1.1) is based on the whole
sample of rural households with 4,101 observations, of which 1,246 house-
holds have formal loans. The second (Test 1.2), which looks at those who
receive formal credit, uses the sample of borrowing households with 2,108
observations. The dependent variable is the log of household formal credit
extended by time of interview.9 The explanatory variables include household
and location characteristics, the availability of credit and the variables that
proxy for competition at the commune and village levels. We also use the
proxy variable for the availability of informal credit at the village level for
the reason that this source of credit may affect household demand for
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formal credit, as explained in Section 3. Table 3 presents the Tobit regres-
sion of the household borrowing equation (Eq. (1)).
At the 95% conﬁdence level, we ﬁnd that the age of the head of the
household (AGE98) is positively and signiﬁcantly related to the amount of
formal credit supplied to households. The signiﬁcance of the squared age
indicates that middle-aged households receive the largest amount of formal
credit. The amount of credit is therefore a nonlinear function of the age of
the head of household. Education of households (EDUCYR98) is signiﬁ-
cant, implying that more educated households receive more formal credit.
Farm households (FARM98) are seen to receive more credit, indicating that
in rural Vietnam, farm households are the preferred clients. Formal credit
extension is also dependent on the size of the household (HHSIZE), possibly
implying that households with more members either demand more credit or
formal lenders provide more credit to them because of their high earning
capacity.
The total farming area of households (LGLAND980) is seen as an in-
dicator of both collateral and the size of farm production and is positively
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Table 1. Summary of Borrowing Households.
Households Percentage Average Loan
Size
(VND1,000)
Monthly
Interest Rate
Borrowing
households
2,108
Formal source 1,246 100% 3,209 1.26%
Private banks and
cooperatives
4.4% 2,230 1.59%
Government
banks
82.2% 3,512 1.27%
Government
programs and
others
13.4% 1,547 0.87%
Informal source 1,213 100% 1,752 3.95%
Money lenders 19% 2,141 4.56%
Relatives 48% 1,861 2.63%
ROSCAs and
other
individuals
33% 1,366 3.69%
Non-borrowing
households
1,993
Total 4,101
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and signiﬁcantly related to the formal credit extended. This indicates that
households owning more farm land demand more credit and formal lenders
in fact offer more credit to those households.
Household ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial savings (LGFISA980 and
LGNFSA980) are signiﬁcantly related to formal credit, but with negative
signs in the ﬁrst test and positive signs in the second test. It is possible that
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Table 3. Results from Tobit Regression: Determinants of Formal
Credit..
Test 1.1 Test 1.2
Coefﬁcient z-Statistic Coefﬁcient z-Statistic
AGE98 3.758498 4.829326 2.196420 3.872094
AGE98AGE98 –0.456323 –5.265458 –0.214564 –3.333159
EDUCYR98 0.185905 3.453552 0.148874 3.690984
FARM98 0.730163 1.612231 0.714636 2.130596
GENDER98 0.476951 1.058321 0.314248 0.930317
HHSIZE 0.616284 6.420827 0.222580 3.107933
LGLAND980 0.465386 7.175849 0.241026 5.013996
LGFISA980 –0.165587 –2.211143 0.135384 2.503009
LGNFSA980 –0.261559 –5.118806 0.042807 1.115107
LGDETE98 0.508889 0.954907 0.382457 0.969152
LGFSOU98 –1.488011 –3.492921 –0.351738 –1.137395
LGNOO98 2.226429 1.672403 0.622205 0.636572
LGPORK98 –0.996639 –0.658557 0.754390 0.667149
LGRICE98 –3.169625 –2.175630 –2.563133 –2.367508
LGSEW98 1.991168 2.920890 0.618908 1.263769
EDUYR98C –0.192808 –1.480780 –0.166986 –1.731353
LGLAN98C –0.747076 –2.058645 –0.706285 –2.671740
RCPIGS98 –2.380690 –0.505146 –5.937609 –1.725125
LGVIIN980 –0.111652 –1.697568 –0.420104 –8.006437
NOHHS98 –0.000263 –0.552376 –0.000449 –1.278521
LGPRFO980 –0.052588 –0.231004 –0.388116 –2.359462
LOGCFO980 0.728956 1.867763 0.571618 1.984287
LGVIFO980 2.872957 9.253923 1.964455 8.633500
C –37.16056 –5.882620 –10.25352 –2.220564
Log likelihood –5598.107 –4424.520
Adjusted R-squared 0.196636 0.270345
Total observations 4,101 2,108
Positive observations 1,246 1,246
Signiﬁcant at 5% level
Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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households with high savings demand less credit and thus they receive less.
But it is also possible that (in the second test) when we use as control only
those households who are clearly revealed to be demanding credit, the pos-
itive signs of ﬁnancial savings indicate that households with more ﬁnancial
savings are seen to be more creditworthy by formal lenders and thus receive
more credit.
We ﬁnd that the availability of formal credit at the commune level
(LOGCFO980) and at the village level (LGVIFO980) is positively and sig-
niﬁcantly related to the formal credit extended to households. However, at
the province level (LGPRFO980), the availability of credit is found to be
negatively and signiﬁcantly related in the second test. This implies that the
availability of formal credit is an important determinant of the amount of
formal credit that one household may receive, but either there is an ine-
quality in allocation of formal credit between communes or there are too
many communes within a province. Speciﬁcally, some communes may re-
ceive less credit than the others in the same province, and thus households
living in these communes may receive less credit compared with other
households living in other provinces. The availability of informal credit at
the village level (LGVIIN980) is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to
household formal credit at the 90% conﬁdence level in the ﬁrst test and at
the 95% level in the second test, implying that where there is an excess
demand for formal credit, i.e., the formal sector does not meet the demand
of credit by households, there exists a market for informal credit.
Of the proxy variables for location (ﬁxed) effects, we ﬁnd that the mean of
education in the commune (EDUYR98C), the mean of farming area in the
commune (LGLAN98C) and the price index of the province (RCPIGS98)
are negatively and signiﬁcantly related to household formal credit, especially
in the second test. A possible explanation of this result is that because
households in ‘‘better’’ communes often demand more credit, the amount of
formal credit that any one household receives is less (but the number of
households receiving credit might be higher). This may imply the fact that
there is rationing in the amount of credit as well as ﬁnancial exclusion.
In short, we have found that total farming area, ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnan-
cial savings and availability of formal credit are signiﬁcant determinants of
household formal credit. Households owning more farming land demand
more credit, and formal lenders are more likely to offer larger amounts of
credit since LUCs can be used as collateral in rural Vietnam. Households
with higher savings may demand less credit. However, if they have more
savings and do have a need for credit, they may receive more generous
formal credit allocation. The availability of formal credit at the village and
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commune levels is important to the amount of formal credit that one
household receives. The results also show that there is an inequality in
allocation of credit within a province or across communes within a province.
5.2. Determinants of Credit Rationing by the Formal Sector
In this section, we test two forms of credit rationing: credit exclusion and
rationing of amounts of credit. In the ﬁrst stage of testing, we use Eq. (2)
and conduct tests on whether households demand formal credit. We use the
sample of 4,101 households, of which 2,108 households request both formal
and informal loans. Given that formal credit is a cheaper source and that it
dominates the rural credit market in rural Vietnam as discussed above, we
assume that if households request loans, they ﬁrst seek formal loans and
thus the dependent variable equals 1 for those who have either formal or
informal loans. However, for a more reasonable assumption, households
with zero-interest informal loans are excluded in the second test for the
reason that non-zero interest borrowers are most likely to demand loans
from the cheaper (rather than interest charging informal lenders) formal
sector. There are 1,645 households with non-zero interest loans. Thus, the
two alternative tests are presented in Table 4a, namely (2.1) and (2.2), re-
spectively.
In the second stage, we use Eq. (3) and conduct the tests on how formal
lenders decide to offer loans. The sample we use for these tests is those
households who have loans, i.e., 2,108 and 1,645 households, respectively.
There are two possibilities: (i) credit exclusion if a household does not re-
ceive any formal loans and (ii) rationing in the amount of credit if a house-
hold has both formal and informal loans.
For the test of credit exclusion, if households have formal loans (1,246
households), the dependent variable takes a value of 1, and otherwise 0. The
inverse Mill’s ratios, which are computed from the ﬁrst stage, are included
as explanatory variables in the second stage. Table 4b represents the second
stage tests, Test 3.1 and Test 3.2. The signiﬁcance of the Mill’s ratios and
high percentages of correct prediction (71.96% and 78.12%) indicate that
the two-stage regressions are more appropriate.
For the test of rationing in amounts of credit, two types of tests were
conducted: (i) If households have informal loans (1,213 and 750 households
for the ﬁrst and second samples, respectively), the dependent variable takes
the value of 1, otherwise 0. The purpose of these tests is to see why QA :3house-
holds are being rationed either being excluded or rationed in amount of
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credit. Table 5a presents the test results (Test 3.3 and Test 3.4 for samples 1
and 2, respectively), and the signiﬁcance of the Mill’s ratios indicates that
the two-stage regressions are appropriate. (ii) If households have both for-
mal and informal loans (351 households for both samples), the dependent
variable takes the value of 1, otherwise 0. The purpose of this test is to see
why households are being rationed in amount of credit. Table 5b shows the
results (Test 3.5 and Test 3.6). The Mill’s ratios are not signiﬁcant in this
test, and thus, the two-stage regression is not necessary.
1
3
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
27
29
31
33
35
37
39
Table 4a. Results from Probit Regression: Probability of Applying for
Formal Credit.
Variable Test 2.1 Test 2.2
Coefﬁcient z-Statistic Coefﬁcient z-Statistic
AGE98 0.166910 1.847101 0.404057 4.265932
AGE98*AGE98 –0.031483 –3.183275 –0.054266 –5.170551
EDUCYR98 0.010287 1.553428 0.010036 1.491136
FARM98 –0.061831 –1.130932 0.067442 1.202834
GENDER98 0.035150 0.649202 0.020321 0.364873
HHSIZE 0.096402 8.065885 0.091849 7.588738
LGLAND980 0.024723 3.170051 0.014459 1.818839
LGFISA980 –0.049451 –5.241171 –0.032069 –3.388112
LGNFSA980 –0.052710 –8.623011 –0.048846 –7.782064
LGDETE98 0.056098 0.882392 0.037159 0.573068
LGFSOU98 –0.279683 –5.383893 –0.312052 –5.939800
LGNOO98 0.467778 2.768203 0.308479 1.820298
LGPORK98 0.241978 1.389808 0.503740 2.853129
LGRICE98 –0.392533 –2.223284 –0.750968 –4.203524
LGSEW98 0.462954 5.742108 0.526625 6.459547
EDUYR98C 0.050313 3.379183 0.051269 3.390795
LGLAN98C 0.113579 2.501985 0.194549 4.240019
RCPIGS98 –0.075613 –0.133571 1.203721 2.119201
C –2.701407 –3.646798 –5.985611 –7.964278
Log likelihood –2609.430 –2526.231
R-squared 0.081505 0.085321
LR statistic 463.1079 471.2892
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000 0.000000
Total observations 4,101 4,101
Dependent variable ¼ 1 2,108 1,645
Percentage correct prediction 63.35 64.81
Signiﬁcant at 5% level
Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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5.3. Who Receives Formal Credit or Who Is Excluded?
As shown in Table 4b, of the household attributes, we ﬁnd that the age of
the head of the household (AGE98) is positively and signiﬁcantly related to
the probability of applying for formal loans and the probability of being
offered them. Education (EDUYR98) is not signiﬁcantly related to the
probability of applying but is signiﬁcantly related to the probability of being
offered credit, implying that formal lenders screen applications by using
education levels. More interestingly, household savings (LGFISA980,
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Table 4b. Results from Probit Regression: Probability of Being Granted
Credit.
Variable Test 3.1 Test 3.2
Coefﬁcient z-Statistic Coefﬁcient z-Statistic
AGE98 0.407103 2.809102 0.106084 3.322559
AGE98*AGE98 –0.032640 –1.914274
EDUCYR98 0.030897 3.025259 0.041918 3.416101
FARM98 0.259537 3.145633 0.144148 1.476160
GENDER98 0.005030 0.060198 0.032832 0.339170
LGFISA980 0.046000 3.105118 0.029831 1.808339
LGNFSA980 0.029256 2.663487 0.050780 4.029634
EDUYR98C –0.052447 –2.231807 –0.045546 –1.641288
LGLAN98C –0.234607 –3.469965 –0.393176 –4.731628
PORU98 –0.000670 –0.267192 –0.000686 –0.233648
NOHHS98 –0.000263 –3.230685 –0.000290 –3.033580
NOFPOR98 –0.000159 –1.073828 –0.000515 –2.950293
LGPRO980 0.055014 4.108307 0.057827 3.756366
LGPRFO980 –0.128837 –3.329671 –0.180923 –3.506067
LOGCFO980 0.160149 2.407301 0.007671 0.095329
LGVIFO980 0.371513 6.937432 0.347980 5.416588
MILLS (1 and 2) –0.822340 –3.867150 –0.735897 –3.894671
C –1.958554 –2.049839 3.075123 2.701524
Log likelihood –1155.080 –792.9777
R-squared 0.189976 0.129876
LR statistic 541.8052 236.7214
Probability (LR stat) 0.000000 0.000000
Total observations 2,108 1,645
Dependent variable ¼ 1 1,246 1,246
Percentage correct prediction 71.96 78.12
Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Signiﬁcant at 10% level
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LGNFSA980) reduce the probability of applying for credit but increase the
probability of being offered it. This indicates that if households have sav-
ings, they are less likely to demand loans, but if they apply, they are more
likely to be successful. In other words, banks are most willing to lend to
those that least need to borrow. The productivity of farming land
(LGPRO980), which is a proxy for the value of collateral, is also found to
be positively and signiﬁcantly related to the probability of being offered a
loan.
As a proxy for competition among households within one location, the
number of households in a commune (NOHHS98) reduces the probability
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Table 5a. Probability of Being Excluded from the Formal Sector.
Variable Test 3.3 Test 3.4
Coefﬁcient z-Statistic Coefﬁcient z-Statistic
AGE98 –0.172633 –1.217220 –0.047822 –1.654851
AGE98*AGE98 0.010842 0.651303
EDUCYR98 –0.025805 –2.627402 –0.025915 –2.392328
FARM98 –0.223021 –2.764176 –0.132880 –1.493275
GENDER98 0.011265 0.138057 –0.018445 –0.209019
LGFISA980 –0.066026 –4.600638 –0.059837 –4.065854
LGNFSA980 –0.036795 –3.501435 –0.051019 –4.566935
EDUYR98C 0.022214 1.010183 0.010843 0.447920
LGLAN98C 0.136742 2.134553 0.199247 2.720781
PORU98 0.003735 1.582073 0.004931 1.909509
NOHHS98 0.000436 5.354588 0.000493 5.462981
NOFPOR98 0.000135 0.938981 0.000374 2.364500
LGPRO980 –0.033255 –2.593995 –0.024726 –1.781610
LGPRFO980 0.211338 5.691731 0.301982 6.379988
LOGCFO980 –0.228339 –3.597153 –0.149362 –2.041934
LGVIFO980 –0.219530 –4.569855 –0.137358 –2.508216
MILLS (1 and 2) 0.653818 3.248622 0.554439 3.278574
C 0.700191 0.816742 –3.538992 –3.387448
Log likelihood –1251.282 –1034.956
R-squared 0.129286 0.087202
LR statistic 371.5890 197.7450
Probability (LR stat) 0.000000 0.000000
Total observations 2,108 1,645
Dependent variable ¼ 1 1,246 750
Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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of receiving formal loans. This may be because there are more applicants for
loans from large communes and thus the probability of success for each
applicant is less. Similarly, the number of poor households in a commune
(NOFPOR98) is negatively signiﬁcant in the second sample (Test 3.2). This
implies either that more applicants reduce the probability of success or that
formal lenders may be discouraged from offering loans where there are more
poor households. The mean of productivity of the farming area in a com-
mune (LGPRO98C) reduces the probability of being offered credit. The
possible reason is that in communes with high productivity, there are more
households applying for loans and thus the probability of success for each
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Table 5b. Probability of Being Rationed in Amount of Credit.
Variable Test 3.5 Test 3.6
Coefﬁcient z-Statistic Coefﬁcient z-Statistic
AGE98 0.381049 2.386669 0.049810 1.589881
AGE98*AGE98 –0.037446 –2.080031
EDUCYR98 0.007475 0.666501 0.009271 0.789857
FARM98 0.004259 0.046046 –0.026075 –0.266399
GENDER98 0.025261 0.277560 0.005615 0.058386
LGFISA980 –0.043559 –2.987450 –0.051701 –3.337208
LGNFSA980 –0.020256 –1.882536 –0.017048 –1.492603
EDUYR98C –0.006331 –0.249587 –0.014025 –0.528158
LGLAN98C –0.076753 –1.116748 –0.129386 –1.801081
PORU98 0.004244 1.567901 0.004838 1.712917
NOHHS98 0.000264 2.940412 0.000332 3.457073
NOFPOR98 9.84E–05 0.584729 –8.28E–07 –0.004688
LGPRO980 0.034881 2.372414 0.033052 2.161167
LGPRFO980 0.136843 3.011024 0.181051 3.590752
LOGCFO980 –0.088627 –1.179738 –0.197566 –2.461886
LGVIFO980 0.254907 3.913084 0.241596 3.472660
C –5.175718 –5.462623 –3.274568 –3.466064
Log likelihood –894.8133 –822.5585
R-squared 0.057343 0.035411
LR statistic 108.8660 60.39470
Probability (LR stat) 7.77E–16 2.16E–07
Total observations 2,108 1,645
Dependent variable ¼ 1 351 351
Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
Signiﬁcant at 10% level.
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household is low. This might imply a quota system of credit allocation by
the formal lenders.
Availability of credit at the province, commune and village levels is found
to be signiﬁcantly related to the probability that one household is offered a
loan. At the province level (LGPR980) it is found to be negatively signiﬁ-
cant, but at the commune level (LOGCFO980) and the village level
(LGVIFO980) it is positively related. The different signs at different levels
are not surprising as they imply inequalities in the distribution of formal
credit between communes and villages within a province. However, the im-
plication is that if formal credit is more available at the village and com-
mune levels, an applicant household has a greater probability of receiving
loans.
The results thus show that the age of the household head, education,
savings, availability of credit and competition among households are the
determinants of credit rationing in the rural credit market. Household sav-
ings may increase the probability of being offered loans as savings are seen
either as collateral or as an indicator of household wealth. The availability
of credit at the village and commune levels also increases the probability of
being offered it as the gap narrows between demand and supply. However,
the number of households and the number of poor households in the com-
mune are variables that reduce the probability of being offered loans from
formal lenders.
5.4. Who Faces Credit Rationing?
The above results have shown why some households receive loans from the
formal sector while others do not. As an attribute of the Probit model, the
results also indicate (with adverse signs of the coefﬁcients) that households
that do not receive any formal loans are those that are completely excluded
from the formal sector. Looking further at those that are excluded from the
formal sector, we conducted further tests to see why they are excluded and
determine the difference, if any, between completely excluded and partly
excluded households.
As shown in Table 5a, most of the key coefﬁcients are with the adverse
signs, compared with those resulting from the tests of households that have
loans from the formal sector. This strengthens the above ﬁndings and once
again indicates that the level of household education, the level of household
savings and the availability of formal credit at the commune and village
levels reduces the probability of being excluded.
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However, when we look at those who are being rationed in amount of
credit, i.e., those who receive loans from both formal and informal sectors,
the results are interesting. As seen in Table 5b, clear evidence is not found of
the effect of age and education levels of the household head on the prob-
ability of being rationed in amount of credit. The number of households in a
commune increases the probability of being rationed in amount of credit
from the formal sector at the 1% level of signiﬁcance in both samples,
indicating that there may be a quota system of credit allocation.
The level of ﬁnancial savings is found to be negatively and signiﬁcantly
related to the probability of being rationed in amount of credit at the 99%
level of conﬁdence, again indicating that household savings reduce the
probability of being excluded and being rationed in the amount of credit.
The level of non-ﬁnancial savings is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to
the probability of being partly excluded at the 95% level of conﬁdence and
for the second sample only.
Surprisingly, at the 99% level of conﬁdence, the availability of formal
credit at the province and village levels is positively and signiﬁcantly related
to the probability of being rationed in the amount of credit from formal
credit for both samples, while the availability of formal credit at the com-
mune level is negative and signiﬁcantly related to the probability of being
partly excluded at 5% signiﬁcance for the second sample. The positive effect
of the availability of credit at the village level indicates that demanding
households may have a high probability of getting formal loans in the vil-
lage where formal credit is available, but the amount of the loan is insufﬁ-
cient, and thus they have to borrow from the informal sector. This seems to
prove the case of VBARD, which usually grants 50% of the loan amount
requested and meets only 14% of the effective demand10 for loans from the
low income households in rural Vietnam (Dao, 2002).
The result thus suggests that the key reason why households are being
rationed in the amount of credit is the quota system of credit allocation by
formal lenders (mainly VBARD). It also indicates that savings are impor-
tant factors inﬂuencing the amount of credit being granted in rural Vietnam.
5.5. The Impact of Credit on the Welfare of Households
The ﬁrst stage regression uses Eq. (1). We use the sample of 4,101 house-
holds, of which 2,108 households have loans. The dependent variable is the
log of total household borrowings, including formal and informal loans.
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Explanatory variables include all variables that have been used in Section
3.1. The test results are presented in Table 6a.
Basically, there are no differences in the effects of household and location
attributes on total borrowings, as compared with borrowing from formal
sources of credit (see Tables 6a and 3). However, for the variables reﬂecting
the availability of formal credit, there are some points to note: (i) availability
of formal credit at the province level is found to be positively and
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Table 6a. Results from Tobit Regression: Determinants of Household
Borrowings.
Variable Coefﬁcient z-Statistic
AGE98 1.349238 2.743424
AGE98*AGE98 –0.222313 –4.091714
EDUCYR98 0.074426 2.079463
FARM98 –0.218607 –0.737600
GENDER98 0.308263 1.041345
HHSIZE 0.523353 8.092091
LGLAND980 0.231562 5.406392
LGFISA980 –0.216638 –4.325020
LGNFSA980 –0.313294 –9.322477
LGDETE98 –0.110967 –0.319148
LGFSOU98 –1.196459 –4.213158
LGNOO98 2.887991 3.191280
LGPORK98 0.798256 0.815365
LGRICE98 –1.209699 –1.243912
LGSEW98 2.166007 4.950512
EDUYR98C 0.017579 0.209168
LGLAN98C –0.248341 –1.000495
RCPIGS98 5.121724 1.625574
LGVIIN980 0.391335 8.247937
NOHHS98 0.000433 1.435173
LGPRFO980 0.292953 3.189332
LOGCFO980 –0.231167 –2.201784
LGVIFO980 0.667861 7.758944
C –22.05987 –5.381328
Log likelihood –8284.762
Adjusted R-squared 0.140771
Total observations 4,101
Positive observations 2,108
**Signiﬁcant at 10% level QA :8.Signiﬁcant at 5% level.
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signiﬁcantly related to household borrowings, while it is found to be neg-
atively and signiﬁcantly related to formal credit and (ii) availability of for-
mal credit at the commune level is found to be negatively and signiﬁcantly
related to household borrowings but positively and signiﬁcantly related to
formal credit. This possibly implies that where formal credit supply is re-
stricted, households may borrow more from informal lenders.
In the second stage, Eq. (4) is employed. We use the sample of 4,109
households with three dependent variables in logarithmic form as proxies
for household welfare: per capita expenditure, per capita food expenditure
and per capita non-food expenditure. The explanatory variables, among
others, include the log of total household borrowings and the predicted
residuals computed from the ﬁrst stage. The results are presented in Ta-
ble 6b. The signiﬁcance of predicted residuals to dependent variables indi-
cates that the two-stage regressions are more appropriate.
The results show that household borrowing is indeed statistically and
signiﬁcantly related to household welfare. At the 95% conﬁdence level, a
10% increase in total borrowings results in a 0.5% increase in per capita
expenditure, 0.3% in per capita food expenditure and 1.1% in per capita
non-food expenditure. This result conﬁrms the hypothesis that access to
credit increases household welfare and reconﬁrms ﬁndings from recent
studies (Khandker, 2003; Khandker & Faruqee, 2003; Pitt & Khandker,
1996). However, the effect is found to be small, and it may raise the issue of
cost-effectiveness in providing ﬁnancial services to rural areas.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an analysis of the rural credit market in Vietnam and its
impact on household welfare has been attempted. Unlike many other coun-
tries, the formal sector has dominated the rural credit market in Vietnam,
and so the results may potentially differ in the case of Vietnam. The market
share of the formal sector has actually increased from 49% in 1998 to more
than 70% in mid-2001. A study by Dao (2001) indicates that if households
demand credit, they ﬁrst apply for loans from the formal sector (e.g., gov-
ernment banks), largely because interest rates are subsidised and thus lower
than in the informal sector. However, for many reasons, households choose
to borrow from the informal sector at much higher interest rates. They are
either those who are completely excluded from the formal sector or those
being rationed in the amount of credit. A number of households borrow
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from their relatives and friends at zero-interest rates, but these households
have been excluded from the analysis of credit rationing by formal lenders.
For those who receive loans from formal sources, the amount of credit
that they may receive is affected by various factors, of which education,
household savings, the availability of credit and the area devoted to farming
are important. Apart from the availability of credit, education, household
savings and farming area all represent the wealth of households. The results
thus indicate that formal lenders tend to provide more credit to households
that are better off. Similarly, we found that households with higher edu-
cational standards, higher savings and higher productivity of land are more
likely to receive loans. This again strengthens the hypothesis that formal
credit is for wealthier rural households and that formal lenders are most
willing to grant loans to those who are better off. Interestingly, we have
found that for households who are being rationed in the amount of credit,
the quota system in credit allocation is the key factor and this seems to
prove the case of VBARD.
This analysis has also demonstrated that credit has a positive effect on
household welfare as represented by per capita expenditure (food/non-
food). Although the QA :5effect is small, it does contribute to the notion that
access to credit may be an essential tool for poverty reduction in rural areas.
It also raises the issue of the cost-effectiveness of this approach to poverty
reduction. It may be that a policy better aimed at the poor is required.
Since the government of Vietnam is committed to providing credit to
rural households as a key component of its strategy for rural development
and poverty reduction (Dao, 2002), the policy implications drawn from the
ﬁndings in this paper are as follows: First, given the effect of farming area
and its productivity on household formal credit, land reforms should be
accelerated. Many provinces have not yet ﬁnished the issuance of LUCs
(Dao, 2002) and thus rural households may ﬁnd it hard to gain access to
formal credit as LUCs can be used as collateral. Second, the importance of
the availability of credit at the village and commune levels indicates that the
government should encourage the expansion of bank branch networks. Al-
though interest rates in the banking sector are gradually being liberalised,
the requirement to charge centrally determined interest rates plus a small
margin (0.3% and 0.5% per month for short-term and medium-/long-term
loans, respectively (Dao, 2002)), remains a constraint on banks’ ability to
cover lending costs and to develop lending at risk-premium based rates.
Thus, a further liberalisation of interest rates could create more incentives
for banks (VBARD, VBP) and induce more efﬁcient lending. Third, better-
off households seem to beneﬁt more from formal credit. In order to ensure
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that poorer households gain access to formal credit, the applicant-screening
process should not be based on criteria representing a household’s wealth.
More emphasis should, for example, be placed on business plans, pre- and
post-loan training and group borrowing. Last but not least, using local
information obtained from NGOs and other social organisations could be a
good policy, but it may raise the danger of delinquency because the rotating
system of lending employed by these organisations may hide the nature of
repayment.
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NOTES
1. According to the CGAP, formal providers are sometimes deﬁned as those that
are subject not only to general laws but also to speciﬁc banking regulation and
supervision (development banks, savings and postal banks, commercial banks, and
non-bank ﬁnancial intermediaries). Formal providers may also be any registered
legal organisations offering any kind of ﬁnancial services. Semi-formal providers are
registered entities subject to general and commercial laws but are not usually under
bank regulation and supervision (ﬁnancial NGOs, credit unions and cooperatives).
Informal providers are non-registered groups such as rotating savings and credit
associations (ROSCAs) and self-help groups.
2. See for examples Khandker (1998), Panjaitan–Drioadisuryo (1999), Remenyi
(2000) QA :4, Wright (2000), Khandker (2001), Coleman (2002), Pham and Izumita (2002),
Khandker and Faruqee (2003), Quach, Mullineux, and Murinde (2003), etc.
3. We include the semi-formal sector in formal sector, and thus the formal sector
includes banks, credit and savings institutions, microﬁnance programs by NGOs,
national programs, etc. The informal sector includes loans from relatives, friends,
revolving credit associations, etc.
4. See for examples McCarty (2001), Quach (2001) QA :5, Dao (2002), Pham and
Izumita (2002), and Quach et al. (2003).
5. An LUC allows households to manage and use their farming land for farm
production and it can be transferred. It is not a certiﬁcate of possession.
6. M. H. Quach participated in this survey as a team leader, conducting household
interviews and processing data in 15 selected provinces across the country from May
to July 2001.
7. It is described as a small group of people, each of whom borrows money from a
bank. The bank does not require collateral because the borrowers are relatively poor
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and do not own much property. Instead, the bank requires group members to be
jointly liable for each other’s loans – that is, if a member defaults on a loan, the rest
of the group is liable for the remainder of the loan. If the group does not honour this
joint obligation, then the entire group is cut off from future access to credit.
8. We imply both production and consumption. However, we assume that formal
credit is mainly for the purpose of small business and farm production.
9. Including outstanding loans and loans already paid within 12 months.
10. Calculated as the ratio of (total low-income households receiving loans 
amount of loan granted) over (total low income households  amount of loan
requested) (Dao, 2002).
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